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Abstract
Proponents of free trade argue that export promotion distorts competition and undermines the
multilateral trade system. In most countries export insurance is provided by the government and,
consequently, is driven more by a broad range of policy objectives than purely insurance principles.
This paper, however, shows that export promotion does not necessarily imply trade distortions and
that most export destinations do not benefit from insurance premium subsidies. A significant policy
implication of these findings is that the WTO and the EU are correct not to banish completely official
export insurance.
Introduction
Export promotion by governments remains a matter of profound controversy
among academic economists, policy-makers and business representatives.
Based on theoretical insights from the strategic trade literature (see Brander
and Spencer, 1985) and on real world examples such as the Japanese Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), advocates of an active export pro-
motion policy support the idea of an independent official export agency that
strengthens the export position of domestic companies. Proponents of free
trade argue that such export promotion distorts competition and undermines
the multilateral free trade system (e.g. Bhagwati, 1988). The objectives of official
export promotion programmes are moreover likely to be captured by powerful
interest groups as emphasised in political economy models of international
trade (for a recent survey see Helpman, 1995). For those reasons, free traders
support efforts of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the European Union
(EU) to control export subsidies.
While the debate is often heated, knowledge about the policies and ob-
jectives of official export institutions is seldom available. Do official export
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programs distort trade and hence breach the rules of the multilateral trad-
ing system? Or is their main objective to create trade without causing major
competitive distortions? What kind of policy instruments do they use? To what
extent are their policies influenced by political interests and powerful lobby
groups?
This paper attempts to close some of this knowledge gap by focusing on ex-
port promotion by official export insurance agencies. Our interest is motivated
by the multifaceted objective function of official export insurance agencies and
their intricate use of trade policy instruments to pursue those objectives. On
the one hand, their insurance activity stimulates trade by providing coverage
against political and commercial risk of default for exporters operating on high-
risk markets. In doing so, they determine insurance premiums and coverage
rates following (at least partially) private market insurance principles.1 This mar-
ket orientation and the positive effect on trade explain why official export in-
surance is not prohibited by the WTO Subsidy Code and EU competition policy
dealing with state aid. On the other hand, those agencies grant trade-distorting
export subsidies that are in conflict with WTO and EU rules. Moreover, the ob-
jectives of official export insurance agencies are influenced by political factors
and vested interests. In several countries, export insurance is closely inter-
twined with government policy on official development assistance and debt
rescheduling for developing countries. In addition, export insurance subsidies
are systematically directed towards selected markets and specific industries,
benefiting a clearly identified group of companies and sectors. In this last re-
spect, official export insurance displays some of the features emphasised in
the strategic trade literature.
In this paper we analyse in depth the objectives and policy conduct of official
export insurance agencies. In the first section, we briefly sketch the institu-
tional background of official export insurance and present aggregate export
subsidy estimates for several OECD countries as well as detailed evidence for
the Belgian case. In Section two we formally model the behaviour of an official
export insurance agency combining elements of the insurance and international
trade literature. The third part of the paper is devoted to an empirical estimation
of those theoretical relationships using disaggregated Belgian data for the pe-
riod 1987–1993. A concluding section summarises the insights from our work
and derive the implications for the research on export promotion and the control
of export subsidies.
1. Institutional aspects and objectives of official export
insurance agencies
In many OECD countries public or semi-public institutions provide export in-
surance against commercial and political risk of default. Official export insur-
ance agencies (OEIAs) insure short-, medium-, and long term export contracts
with risky importers and to risky export destinations. Higher risk markets are
EXPORT PROMOTION 7
often located in developing countries. Domestic exporters pay an insurance
premium and, in case of non-payment by the importer, receive the insured
amount multiplied by the coverage rate specified in the contract. Coverage
is typically very high with maximum coverage rates in OECD countries ranging
from 85% to full coverage of 100%. After reimbursing the exporter, the export
insurance agency attempts to recover the unpaid amounts (the claims) from the
importer.
The statutes of most OEIAs explicitly mention risk coverage as their main
task. Exporting companies are supported because they can insure themselves
against risk of default in higher risk markets. In providing insurance, the agen-
cies are supposed to operate according to sound insurance principles. This im-
plies that, in competitive markets, insurance premiums should be fair, that is—
abstracting from administration costs—they should cover expected claims. The
statutes of OEIAs usually prohibit any discrimination between domestic export-
ing companies operating in the same sector. Hence, premiums can and should
be differentiated only across export destinations, not across export industries.
Likewise, OEIAs can limit their overall risk exposure by reducing the share of
riskier export destinations in the total value of insured export contracts. This
is achieved by either increasing insurance premium rates or/and by imposing
coverage ceilings. For any country group, both contract elements will influence
the share in total insured amounts, henceforth labelled as the regional coverage
rate. The regional coverage ceiling and the insurance premium rate are the main
policy instruments of OEIAs and will be discussed in this paper.
On the other hand, OEIAs are usually obliged by their statutes to actively
strengthen the competitive position of domestic exporters on international mar-
kets. This means that export insurance should stimulate exports to high-risk
markets. For this purpose export insurance should be as cheap as possible. In
practice, the objective of competitive export promotion has led OEIAs to main-
tain coverage in markets where insurance principles would advise a reduction
in regional coverage rates. This follows directly from the subsidisation of export
contracts to some high-risk countries by charging insurance premiums below
the fair premium.
This subsidisation is responsible for the heavy financial losses that OEIAs
incurred in the eighties and nineties. Such long-term losses are explicitly pro-
hibited by the WTO Subsidy Code because they are seen as a potential source
of competitive distortions of world trade. For EU member states, export in-
surance premiums below private market rates that distort competition on EU
markets are in breach with competition policy on state aid.
Figure 1 presents information on average subsidisation rates in 15 OECD
countries during the period 1988–1992. Subsidy rates are computed as the
difference between total claims and total premium income of the OEIA as a
percentage of insured exports.2 According to this subsidy measure, all countries
but Portugal grant export insurance subsidies. Subsidy rates range from 2.5 to
7.5% in most countries but exceed 10% in Italy, Spain and Norway.3
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Figure 1. Average international export insurance subsidy rates (i.e., claims-premiums as a per-
centage of insured amounts) for 1988–1992. (a) Figures refer to 1988–1991. (b) Figures refer to
1989–1991. Source: Calculations based on data provided by the NDD.
These figures represent an average and hide the fact that export insurance
subsidies are targeted towards selected sectors and export destinations. Stud-
ies for France, the UK, Germany and Belgium by Abraham (1990), Abraham et al.
(1992), Dewit (1996) and Messerlin and Melitz (1987) show that a few sectors ac-
count for virtually all of the export insurance subsidies. In those sectors, OEIAs
are typically subsidising larger companies which conclude sizeable medium
and long term export contracts with importers in a relatively small number of
higher risk countries. Those companies and those sectors have strong vested
interests in the existence of a system of official export insurance.
So do governments because of political interests. Often (but not always4)
official export insurance is closely intertwined with national policies on devel-
opment assistance and foreign affairs. In several countries, OEIAs are asked to
insure politically motivated export contracts on account of their governments.
These contracts are usually medium- or long-term higher risk export trans-
actions to those non-OECD countries with whom the government is eager to
develop or maintain close economic and political relationships. The practice of
tied aid is quite common in this context. A developing country receives official
development aid but is required to spend part of the development assistance on
exports originating in the donor country. Typically, the development funds cover
part of the value of the export contract. To eliminate the risk for the exporting
company, the OEIA is asked by the government to insure the contract often at
an insurance premium rate well below the fair premium. Political interference
also occurs when claims of officially insured contracts are dropped or reduced
as part of a debt rescheduling package for less developed countries. OEIAs
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are subject to political pressure because they depend on their governments to
finance the losses that result from export insurance subsidisation.5
The political dimension of official export insurance is clearly seen in the
Belgian case for which we obtained detailed data. Table 1 distinguishes between
the regional coverage and subsidy rates on export contracts that were insured
by the Belgian Nationale Delcredere Dienst (NDD) on behalf of the Belgian state
and on its own account. In the period 1984–1993, the politically motivated con-
tracts, insured on behalf of the state, account for 22.6% of all policies insured
by the NDD. The average subsidy rate amounts to 13.5% of the insured con-
tract value and is five times the subsidy figure for the transactions insured on
the own account which are primarily short-term export contracts granted on a
commercial basis.
The components of the OEIA’s objective function—risk coverage, competitive
export promotion and political interests—are reflected in the geographic focus
of official export insurance. For instance, Table 1 illustrates how nearly half of
the insured contracts on behalf of the Belgian government relate to Africa, mir-
roring the country’s colonial past. Those export contracts to Africa are heavily
subsidised. High subsidy rates are also found on contracts to Asia insured on
account of the state and to South America when the NDD’s own account is
considered.
Table 1. Regional disaggregation of Belgian export insurance contracts and
subsidies (1984–1993).
Share in total Subsidisation rate
insured contracts (claims-premiums as %
Region (%) of insured amounts)
NDD account 77.38 2.70
Industrialised countriesa 19.19 0.02
Central & Eastern Europe 12.74 2.25
Africa 22.83 6.39
Central America 4.71 1.77
South America 4.66 8.56
Asia 35.86 1.30
STATE account 22.62 13.47
Industrialised countries 0.00 —
Central & Eastern Europe 22.52 ¡1.14
Africa 48.76 19.23
Central America 10.92 11.92
South America 3.10 7.34
Asia 14.72 19.21
aThis country group contains Western Europe, the USA, Canada, Japan,
Australia and New Zealand.
Source: Calculations are based on data provided by the NDD.
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On the contrary, the NDD’s own contracts to Asian countries are only slightly
subsidised but account for a large (35.9%) and growing6 share of the agency’s
commercial activity, reflecting the rise of several Asian countries as fast grow-
ing trading partners. Likewise, the industrialised country group is approximately
charged a fair premium while premium income on state contracts to Central and
Eastern European countries actually exceeds the claims. Apparently, some ex-
port destinations are subsidised while other are “taxed”, with which we mean
that the premium paid is above the fair premium. In other words, the distinction
between trade creating and trade distorting export insurance displays a regional
pattern. This last point emerges sharply from a further investigation of disag-
gregated data at the country level.7 The majority of countries does not benefit
from insurance subsidies. On the contrary, a small and quite similar insurance
tax is levied on export contracts to most export destinations.
Summarising, this section illustrates how different objectives are reflected in
the policies of the OEIAs. For this reason, a thorough understanding of export
promotion through official export insurance requires a full grasp of the objec-
tives that drive OEAIs and the policy instruments at their disposal. The next
section develops a formal model for such an assessment.
2. A theoretical model of official export insurance
This section formally derives the export insurance policy chosen by an OEIA.
Technically speaking, the theoretical set-up consists of two stages. In the first
stage, the official insurer determines the premium rate and the regional coverage
ceiling. Risk averse firms simultaneously choose the price and the share of the
exports they want to insure in the second stage. Solving the game recursively,
we use the results obtained in the last stage to proceed with the determination
of the premium and the regional coverage ceiling in the first stage, both of which
will influence the observed regional coverage rate.
2.1. Official export insurance and the exporting company
Consider any risk averse firm which applies for insurance to the domestic offi-
cial export insurance agency for exports to markets which are characterised by
risk of default. Given the premium rate for the targeted region i , the firm simul-
taneously decides on the export price .pi / and the share of the export contract
value it wants to insure .°i /. The firm maximises its certainty-equivalent profit
function .EVi /:8
max
xi ;°i
EVi D E5i ¡ fl2 var5i .s:t: °i • 1/ (1)
fl is a parameter, representing the degree of risk aversion. The firm’s coverage
choice is restricted by the legal full coverage constraint.9 E5i and var5i denote
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expected profits and the variance of profits respectively, given by:
E5i D .1¡ N‚i /pi xi C .N‚i ¡ ri /°i pi xi ¡ cxi ¡ F with pi D pi .xi / (2a)
var5i D .1¡ °i /2.pi xi /2v2i (2b)
In this equation ‚i symbolises the share of the contract value that is unpaid
which is a stochastic variable with mean N‚i and variance v2i , and with Probf‚i < 0g
D Probf‚i > 1g D 0. We define ri as the premium rate, i.e., the premium per
insured currency unit, and c and F as constants, respectively standing for the
marginal and fixed costs of production.
Most officially insured export contracts apply to manufacturing products.
Given that our data only refer to export contracts for manufactures (typically
characterised by intra-industry trade), it follows quite naturally that the market
of the importing country is likely to be characterised by monopolistic com-
petition between companies from several exporting countries with each firm
producing one variety of the manufactured product.
Demand preferences in the importing country are captured by a Dixit-Stiglitz
“love-of-variety” type of utility function, formally represented by:
U ⁄i D
(X
j
x
.¾i¡1/=¾i
i j
)¾i=.¾i¡1/
¾i > 1 (3)
This utility function features a constant elasticity of substitution .¾i / between
each pair of varieties. Each country exporting to country i produces ni j . j D
d; f/ varieties of manufactures sold at a price pi j , with d and f respectively
indicating varieties produced by the exporting firms of the domestic country
or by its foreign competitors. We assume that firms from the same country are
symmetric. In this set-up, country i ’s demand for variety j; xi j .pi j / equals
xi j .pi j / D E
⁄
i
Pi
P¡¾ii j with Pi D
X
j
p1¡¾ii j and j D d; f (4)
In this equation, E⁄i represents the aggregate expenditure on manufactured
products in country i . ni j xi j stands for country i ’s import demand for manufac-
tures of country j .
A representative domestic exporting firm maximises the profit function of
Eq. (1) w.r.t. output and the insured share of the export contract .°i / subject to
the demand Eq. (4). This yields the following expressions for the firm’s optimal
pricing and insurance decisions:
pid D ¾i
¾i ¡ 1
c
1¡ ri (5)
°i D min
(
1I 1¡ ri ¡
N‚i
flpidxidv2i
)
(6)
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We focus on the effect of the premium rate on the total coverage demand for
region i .Ii D ni°i pi xi /. The premium rate affects the insurance demand for re-
gion i in two ways. First, we concentrate on the effect via the coverage rate (6).
If a fair premium is charged .ri D N‚i /, the exporter wishes to take full insurance.
Moreover, because there is a legal full coverage constraint, the firm is forced
to insure at the ceiling if a premium subsidy is granted .ri < N‚i /. However, if
the firm faces a premium tax .ri > N‚i /, it merely purchases partial insurance.
Second, the revenue made in the export market .pi xi / is also influenced by
the OEIA’s premium policy. More specifically, the OEIA strengthens the com-
petitive position of the exporting company by a reduction in the premium rate
because a lower premium is translated in a decrease of the export price (5),
leading to an expansion of exports ((4) and (5)). Conversely, the OEIA can re-
duce the risk of its portfolio by raising premium rates in high risk markets. This
will force insured exporting companies in those markets to ask higher prices
and hence they will loose customers. As a result, a reduction in the premium
rate for insurance to region i leads to a surge in the demand for insurance to
that market ( d Iidri < 0 since
d°i
dri < 0 for °i < 1 and
d.pi xi /
dri < 0).
2.2. The objective function of the public insurance agency
Formally, the objective function of the public insurer is formulated as:
max
ri
EWi D nidEVi C ai C⁄i ¡ ESi (7)
Expression (7) consists of three terms. Certainty-equivalent profits of the insured
domestic manufacturing industry are captured by nidEVi . In the second term of
(7), C⁄i symbolises the foreign consumer surplus generated in the export market
from buying domestic varieties, given by:10
C⁄i D Ui .nidxid.pid/; ni f xi f .pi f //¡
X
jDd; f
ni j pi j xi j .pi j / (8)
In the OEIA’s objective function foreign consumer surplus enters with a non-
negative weight denoted by ai . The last term in (7) stands for the expected
subsidy cost for the insurance agency .ESi /, with
ESi D .N‚i ¡ ri /°i nid pidxid (9)
Expression (7) bears close similarities to the government objective functions
commonly used in the international trade literature. The first and the last term
measures the expected profits of all insured domestic firms exporting to country
i .E5i /, corrected for the OEIA’s subsidisation costs. This part of the objective
function is comparable to the welfare function of a government maximising
national welfare when total national production is sold in international markets
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(see Brander and Spencer (1985), Eaton and Grossman (1986), Helpman and
Krugman (1989)). Like Grossman and Helpman (1994) we add an aspect to this
objective function that does not appear in the traditional welfare function.
While the OEIA’s premium rate structure is derived from its region-specific
objective function, it uses regional coverage ceilings .I Ci / to preserve a globally
sound risk portfolio, given the sum .G/ the government is prepared to provide
for covering the OEIA’s overall budgetary loss:
max
I ci
X
i
EWi s:t: G ‚
X
i
ESi (10)
These functions capture the various objectives of the OEIA. First, the motive
of efficient risk coverage is represented by the variance term .var5i / in the
certainty-equivalent profit function of insured firms .EVi /. From the derivations
in the second stage of the game, we know that the share of the contract value
for which the firm takes insurance—and hence the risk exposure of the firm—
is influenced by the prevailing premium rate. By lowering the premium rate,
the OEIA reduces the uncertainty borne by the domestic exporting industry
.d°i=dri < 0 for °i < 1/. However, once the premium rate for a particular market
incorporates a subsidy so that the full coverage constraint becomes binding
.°i D 1/, this is no longer true. In other words, in accordance with efficient
insurance provision, the OEIA completely relieves firms from uncertainty at fair
premium rates. Providing insurance at more beneficial premium terms is no
longer in line with sound portfolio risk management, since it only increases
exposure to default risk in region i, without affecting the risk allocation between
insured and insurer.
Secondly, the political interests of the OEIA are captured by the presence
of the foreign consumer surplus in the region-specific objective function. The
OEIA can contribute to general foreign and development policy goals of its na-
tional government by charging low insurance premiums, maintaining coverage
in risky markets and writing off claims from past contracts in debt rescheduling
negotiations. Those actions provide the importing country with cheaper imports
than they would have obtained otherwise which is reflected in a higher foreign
consumer surplus. This creates political goodwill for the exporting country and
contributes to the economic stability in the importing country, not seldom a
developing country.
Thirdly, the goal of competitive export promotion enters the regional objective
function in two ways. One link runs via expected profits of all insured domestic
firms .E5i /, corrected for the OEIA’s subsidisation costs. From Eq. (2a), it is
seen that an insurance premium reduction boosts the profits of the insured
companies .@E5i=@ri D ¡°i pi xi < 0/. Moreover, companies benefit from the
broader political considerations because the increase in the foreign consumer
surplus is achieved by tying the foreign buyer to the products of the exporting
country. From the price optimality condition derived in the second stage, we
know that prices go down when the premium rate decreases .dpi=dri > 0/.
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As a result, foreign consumers will buy more of the domestic products which
enables domestic producers to reinforce their positions in the targeted export
markets.
The OEIA maximises the objective function of Eq. (7) taking into account the
pricing strategy and insurance decisions of the exporting firms which are given
by Eqs. (5) and (6). This leads to the following premium rating rule:
ri D N‚i ¡ ai
¾i ¡ 1 (11)
Given the OEIA’s global budget constraint, the optimal regional coverage ceiling
.I ci / is:
I ci D
G ¡Pi 0 6Di .N‚i 0 ¡ ri 0/Ii 0
N‚i ¡ ri
D .¾i ¡ 1/
£
G ¡Pi 0 6Di .N‚i 0 ¡ ri 0/Ii 0⁄
ai
(12)
These expressions illustrate the impact of the various policy objectives on the
premium rate and coverage ceiling in an interesting way. It points to the role
of risk considerations in official export insurance. When only risk reduction
matters (and hence ai D 0), the OEIA charges a fair premium which equates the
premium rate with the expected claims rate, N‚i . This principle underlies WTO
and EU regulations but is violated in many respects as the subsidy figures in
Section 1 clearly indicate. Equation (11) also establishes that the official export
insurer should adjust the insurance premium upward when faced with higher
risk of default for a specific export destination i (reflected in a higher expected
claim rate, N‚i ). This positive relation between risk and premium rate is analysed
in the regression model below.
In addition, a premium change for exports to region i alters the regional cov-
erage rate, i.e., the share of insured export contracts to region i in the total pool
of contracts .hi /:
hi D IiP
i Ii
(13)
First, consider a risk-induced premium rise. At fair premium pricing, the demand
for insurance for exports to the market involved clearly decreases ( d Iidri < 0, hencedhi
dri < 0). There is no need for a restricting ceiling if political or business interests
do not matter (ai D 0, hence I ci !1, ri D N‚i , and Ii is the unconstrained demand
for insurance).
A premium reduction increases the insured export package to the destination
involved. However, if political and business interests enter the OEIA’s policy for
a particular market .ai > 0/, export insurance is subsidised. Then, the regional
coverage limit may become binding. As suggested by (12), the regional cover-
age ceiling is more likely to become effective if a concern for export promotion
or politically inspired aid is highly important (ai large). This is logical since, while
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such non-risk considerations are translated into lower premiums, the need for
a reasonably sound insurance portfolio and an affordable budget deficit keeps
regional coverage ceilings relatively low. In that case, the regional coverage rate
is determined by the OEIA’s restricted supply.
This relationship between regional coverage rate and premium rate lies at the
basis of the two hypotheses that we will test in the regression equation for the
regional coverage rate. First, we expect higher risk (an increase in N‚i ) leading
to lower regional coverage through its impact on the premium rate or through
the absolute ceilings for the amounts insured in subsidised high risk markets.
Secondly, if alternative motives, such as export promotion and political objec-
tives, are effectively transmitted into premium reductions, the OEIA reduces
the regional coverage ceiling for that particular destination, making the role of
regional coverage ceilings apparent.
3. An empirical investigation
3.1. The regression model
In this section of the paper, we examine the export insurance policy of OEIAs
empirically by using data11 for the Belgian official export insurance agency,
NDD. We construct a premium rating Eq. (14) and an equation explaining the
regional coverage rate (15) on the other hand:
rit D fi0 C fi1clmsi;exp C fi2rvsi;t¡1 C fi3debti;t¡1 C fi4debtsvi;t¡1 C fi5fdii;t¡1
Cfi6gdpcapi;t¡1 C fi7gdpgrwi;t¡1 C fi8mktshi;t¡1 C fi9odai;hist
C
X
i
fii;10dumregi C "i t (14)
hit D µ0 C µ1clmsi;exp C µ2rvsi;t¡1 C µ3debti;t¡1 C µ4debtsvi;t¡1 C µ5fdii;t¡1
C µ6gdpcapi;t¡1 C µ7gdpgrwi;t¡1 C µ8mktshi;t¡1 C µ9odai;hist
C
X
i
µi;10dumregi C &i t : (15)
rit is the premium rate for country i in period t , measured by the premium
income as a percentage of insured contracts. The regional coverage rate for
country i in period t is denoted by hit , calculated as insured contracts for ex-
ports to country i as a percentage of the total contract portfolio held by the NDD.
The notations for the independent variables are explained in Table 2. Table 2
also shows the expected signs of the coefficients, linking these conjectured
signs to the underlying objectives the OEIA may have in determining its export
insurance policy. The column headings ‘RISK’, ‘POL’ and ‘CEP’ respectively
refer to the objectives of risk coverage, political interests and competitive ex-
port promotion. In view of the geographic focus of Belgian export insurance
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Table 2. Summary of the independent variables and the expected coefficient signs.
Expected coefficient signs
Premium rate Regional coverage rate
equation (14) equation (15)
Notationa Explanation RISK POL CEP RISK POL CEP
clmsbi Claim payments by the Belgian fi1 C µ1 ¡
official export credit insurance
agency per insured contracts
to country i
rvsi Foreign currency reserves fi2 ¡ µ2 C
of country i as a percentage
of its total imports
debti External debt ratio of country fi3 C ¡ µ3 ¡ C
i , expressed as a percentage
share of its total exports
debtsvi External debt service ratio fi4 C ¡ µ4 ¡ C
of country i , expressed as
a percentage share of its
total exports
fdii Foreign direct investment into fi5 ¡ µ5 C
country i , expressed as a
fraction of the country’s
external debt
gdpcapi GDP per capita in country i fi6 ¡ µ6 C
gdpgrwi GDP growth in country i fi7 ¡ µ7 C
mktshi Share of Belgian exports to fi8 ¡ µ8 C
country i in total imports
of country i
odaci Belgian official development fi9 ¡ µ9 C
assistance to country i
aAll variables except clmsi and odai are included in the premium rate and regional coverage rate
equations with a one year lag.
bThis measure refers to ‘experienced’ (exp) claims, accumulated over the previous three years
(
P
xD1 insured contractsIt¡x ).
cCalculated as a weighted average of aid provided in previous years (denoted by ‘hist’; hence
odai;hist, appears in (14) and (15)).
(see Section 1), regional dummies (dumreg) for Africa, South-America, Central
America and Asia are added to the model. Those regional dummy variables
provide additional information about risk, political interest and competitive ex-
port promotion that is not yet captured by the explanatory variables which are
discussed below. The error terms in the equations are denoted by "i and &i
respectively.
We now discuss our expectations of the coefficients of the explanatory vari-
ables reported in Table 2.
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1. Risk coverage. The agency is likely to form its expectations about the
future default risk on its claim payments incurred in the past. Hence, we use
data on the past claim rate as one of the indicators of the default expected by
the OEIA. The practice of experience rating justifies the use of such a claim rate
measure in our model. More specifically, a high claim rate in the past will lead to
a high expected claim rate for the future. In turn, this implies that the premium
rate should be high too, provided that the main objective of the OEIA is sound
risk coverage (i.e., fi1 > 0 ). Likewise, the high risk associated with regions with
a high claim rate should induce agencies with a sound portfolio management to
keep the regional coverage rate to those export destinations down (i.e., µ1 < 0).
Still, the default expected by OEIAs is based on more than just the claims they
had to pay in the past. Indicators of political risk, i.e., the importing country’s
global risk of default, are captured in our empirical model by a set of one-
year-lagged macroeconomic risk variables. Among these are indicators of the
external financial position of the export destination. Our model includes the
foreign currency reserves ratio (rvs), the external debt (debt) and the external
debt service (debtsv) ratios of the export market. A healthy external financial
position, reflected in adequate foreign currency reserves and low debt and debt
service ratios, is bound to lower expectations of the default risk. So, if sound risk
management matters for the OEIA, this should be translated into a negative rvs-
coefficient and positive coefficients for the debt and debtsv variables in Eq. (11).
In addition, the OEIA could allow the proportion of insured contracts for the
region involved to be quite high if that country’s external financial position is
relatively sound. Therefore a positive rvs-coefficient and negative coefficients
for debt and debtsv are expected for the estimation of Eq. (12).
In addition to the group of financial macroeconomic variables, we include in-
dicators of the level of development (gdpcap) and the productive capacity of the
export market (gdpgrw, fdi12) in the regression model. Markets characterised by
a high GDP growth, a relatively high level of development and significant foreign
direct investment generally can quite comfortably generate export earnings to
service their debt. Under these conditions the country risk of default usually is
considered to be quite low. Hence, premium rates for markets that perform well
in terms of these indicators should be relatively low. In other words, the signs
of the coefficients of these variables are expected to be negative in Eq. (11)
(see Table 2). Meanwhile, OEIAs are likely to allow markets with a substantial
productive capacity to account for a relatively large proportion of total under-
written contracts. The conjectured signs for the coefficients of gdpcap, gdpgrw
and fdi in Eq. (12) are therefore positive.
2. Political interests. The expected signs of the coefficients of the variables
which may influence the policy of OEIAs through a concern for political interests
are reported in the column with subheading ‘POL’ in Table 2.
Throughout this paper we emphasised the political link between official devel-
opment assistance and official export insurance. For this reason, we incorporate
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Belgian expenditures on official development assistance to each country (oda)
in the regression model. We hypothesise that official export insurance sup-
plements the political goals of official development policy by providing cheap
insurance and by maintaining insurance coverage in developing countries that
benefit from Belgian official development assistance. Therefore, we predict a
negative effect on the regression coefficient in the premium equation and a
positive sign for the oda coefficient in the regional coverage equation.
Debt rescheduling is another political imperative of importance for official
export insurance. OEIAs may be politically pressured to maintain insurance
coverage and to set low premium rates in countries that face high debt and
debt service ratios in spite of the higher risk of default. If political interests
dominate risk considerations, the signs of the regression coefficients of the
debt and debt service variables are reversed compared to a scenario where
sound risk management dictates the terms of export insurance.
3. Competitive export promotion. We argued before that the efforts of the
Belgian NDD to support the foreign sales and raise the profits of domestic
exporters are reflected in the substantial premium subsidies to specific export
destinations. Unfortunately, it is not simple to come up with measures that
capture this policy objective in a regression model. We restrict our attention to
a market share indicator (mktsh) that expresses Belgian exports to country i as
a percentage share of world exports with the same destination. If Belgian firms
occupy a relatively large market share in a particular export market, they benefit
substantially from low insurance premiums and high regional coverage rates.
They therefore have a strong incentive to jointly lobby for favourable insurance
premiums to those export markets. Ceteris paribus, the official mandate of the
Belgian export insurer to support business interests makes a lower premium
rate and a higher regional coverage rate a likely outcome (fi8 < 0 and µ8 > 0).
3.2. The regression results
Based on the cross section data-set described in the Appendix, Tables 3 and 4
present the regression results for Eqs. (11) and (12). The estimation method used
is ordinary least squares. In addition to estimating the total sample, we make
a distinction between export destinations that have received export insurance
subsidies from the Belgian NDD and those that have been taxed.
The regression results provide interesting insights in the objectives and the
functioning of the Belgian export insurance agency:
1. Risk coverage. In providing export insurance to companies, the NDD takes
into account risk characteristics of the export market. Taking a look at re-
gional coverage rates in Table 4 first, we find highly significant positive regress-
ion coefficients for the foreign reserve ratio .µ2/ ranging from 0.247 for the taxed
countries, to 0.283 in the full sample and to 0.424 for the subsidised countries.
In accordance with sound risk management, the NDD provides more insurance
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Table 3. Determinants of premium rating (14) in Belgian public export
insurance.
Global Sub Tax
c.fi0/ 2.411c 1.391c 2.273c
(5.039) (5.319) (4.733)
clms.fi1/ ¡0.007 ¡0.005 0.884c
(¡1.697) (¡1.515) (9.996)
rvs.fi2/ ¡0.057 0.027 ¡0.013
(¡1.210) (0.461) (¡0.252)
debt.fi3/ ¡0.0003 ¡0.0003 0.001
(¡1.008) (¡1.219) (0.897)
debtsv.fi4/ 0.009 0.001 0.006
(1.632) (0.257) (0.951)
fdi.fi5/ 0.051 0.027 ¡0.010
(1.660) (0.765) (¡0.275)
gdpcap.fi6/ 0.0003 0.001 ¡0.002
(0.146) 0.266) (¡0.956)
gdpgrw.fi7/ 0.002 0.004 ¡0.001
(0.538) (1.178) (¡0.131)
mktsh.fi8/ ¡0.147c ¡0.183c ¡0.124c
(¡3.811) (¡3.575) (¡2.922)
oda.fi9/ 0.001 0.002d 0.001
(1.542) (2.090) (0.943)
dumafra.fiafr,10/ ¡0.410 0.372 ¡0.733
(¡0.956) (1.885) (¡1.915)
dumcama.ficam;10/ ¡1.100d ¡1.290c
(¡2.558) (¡3.371)
dumsama.fisam;10/ 0.154 0.183 0.155
(0.608 ) (0.672) (0.539)
dumasa.fias;10/ ¡0.314 ¡0.556 0.033
(¡1.359) (¡1.765) (0.136)
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.204 0.590
nb 186 77 109
aThese are the regional dummies for Africa, Central America, South
America and Asia respectively.
bn stands for the number of observations.
cSignificant at 1% level.
dSignificant at 5% level.
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Table 4. Determinants of regional coverage rates (15) in Belgian
export insurance.
Global Sub Tax
c.µ0/ 0.859 ¡0.079 0.206
(1.159) (¡0.127) (0.255)
clms.µ1/ ¡0.009 ¡0.013 ¡0.018
(¡1.445) (¡1.567) (¡0.124)
rvs.µ2/ 0.283c 0.423c 0.247c
(3.880) (3.002) (2.799)
debt.µ3/ ¡0.001 ¡0.000 ¡0.002
(¡1.789) (¡0.298) (¡1.245)
debtsv.µ4/ 0.059c 0.022 0.092c
(6.712) (1.649) (8.069)
fdi.µ5/ ¡0.090 ¡0.077 ¡0.069
(¡1.871) (¡0.930) (¡1.152)
gdpcap.µ6/ 0.011c 0.012d 0.008d
(4.064) (2.177) (2.585)
gdpgrw.µ7/ 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.475) (0.419) (0.153)
mktsh.µ8/ ¡0.293c ¡0.453c ¡0.282c
(¡4.919) (¡3.720) (¡3.967)
oda.µ9/ 0.005c 0.008c 0.004c
(5.234) (3.226) (4.621)
dumafra.µafr;10/ ¡1.397d ¡0.249 ¡0.869
(¡2.103) (¡0.533) (¡1.350)
dumcama.µcam;10/ ¡2.106c ¡2.425c
(¡3.161) (¡3.770)
dumsama.µsam;10/ ¡1.874c ¡2.315d ¡1.295c
(¡4.764) (¡3.584) (¡2.680)
dumasa.µas;10/ ¡0.066 ¡1.990d 0.856d
(¡0.185) (¡2.661) (2.106)
Adjusted R2 0.435 0.217 0.615
nb 186 77 109
aThese are the regional dummies for Africa, Central America, South
America and Asia respectively.
bn stands for the number of observations.
cSignificant at 1% level.
dSignificant at 5% level.
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to countries that possess more foreign reserves in relation to their imports. The
larger coefficient for the subsidised export destinations suggests that the NDD
monitors the reserve ratio more closely for countries that receive insurance
premium subsidies. Likewise, the positive coefficient for the per capita GDP
variable indicates that the NDD reduces the risk of its portfolio by limiting ex-
posure in lower income countries. Note also that the claims and debt variables,
while not statistically significant from zero, have the negative sign that we would
expect for an insurance company eager to limit risk.
Concern for risk management is furthermore seen in the significantly negative
regional dummies for the African, Central and South American, and subsidised
Asian export markets. Ceteris paribus, the NDD is less willing to insure exports
to those countries. Considering that those regions already received the bulk of
the insurance subsidies (see the discussion earlier in this paper) and include
several countries that faced serious economic problems in the late eighties and
early nineties, lowering the regional coverage rate is a reasonable thing to do
from an insurance point of view.
The insurance premium rate is also used as an instrument of risk manage-
ment but clearly less so than the regional coverage rate. In Table 3 the expected
claims rate is the only risk variable that has a statistically significant impact on
the insurance premium rate. The significance is moreover limited to the taxed
country group. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that risk consid-
erations in export insurance to subsidised countries are more likely to appear
through the OEIA’s direct control of the coverage rate than through the indirect
coverage effect via the premium rate. Risk management by premium setting is
limited to countries that do not benefit from subsidies. For those countries an
increase of the claim rate by 10 basis points leads to an upward adjustment
of the insurance premium rate by 8.8 points. This amounts to a close to full
pass-through of default risk in insurance premium setting.
Macroeconomic measures of country risk are not taken into account in deter-
mining the premium rate. Apparently, the regional premium policy of the Belgian
OEIA is based on its own experience with unpaid export contracts as reflected
in the claims variable.
While risk matters, the NDD does not always adhere strictly to insurance
principles. The most striking illustration is the absence of risk considerations in
premium setting for export destinations that receive export insurance subsidies.
In effect, neither the claims rate nor any other risk measure in Table 3 signifi-
cantly affects the insurance premium rate of the subsidised country group. As
a consequence, the explanatory power of the risk variables is low for the sub-
sidised country group and for the total sample when compared to the taxed
export destinations. In other words, the NDD no longer differentiates premium
rates according to risk for those countries that are granted export insurance
subsidies. Clearly other objectives play an important role in this case.
2. How important are political interests in Belgian official export insurance?
There exists a statistically significant relation between official development
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assistance and the regional coverage rate (see the coefficient of oda in Table 4).
The NDD directs a larger share of its insurance activities to countries that are the
main beneficiaries of Belgian official development aid. A comparison of regres-
sion coefficients learns that this link between development aid is stronger for
contracts to subsidised than to taxed export markets.13 Those findings are con-
sistent with the earlier discussed practice of tied aid where the NDD is asked to
insure politically motivated export contracts at favourable insurance premium
rates which are financed partially by Belgian official development funds.
Political interference is also reflected in the regression coefficient for the debtsv
indicator in the estimation equation for the regional coverage rate (see Table 4).
With a substantial part of their export earnings going to meeting their debt
obligations, countries with a large debt service ratio have less funds available
to pay for their imports. In fact, countries with a high debt service ratio are
typically the ones that are involved in renegotiating and rescheduling the debt.
Under those conditions, we would expect an insurance company to reduce
exposure and hence decrease the regional coverage rate. Yet, the NDD does
exactly the opposite: the regression coefficient for debtsv is positive. This result
is explained by the political link between debt rescheduling and official export
insurance. In order to avoid a politically and economically undesirable dramatic
reduction of Belgian exports, the NDD is asked to maintain coverage for specific
countries with payment problems.
The commitment to political imperatives is not absolute. We already pointed
to the role of the risk variables in the determination of the regional coverage
rate. Analogously, the NDD balances some of the politically motivated risk by
charging a higher insurance premium rates for countries that receive Belgian
official development assistance (see the positive sign of the oda variable in
Table 2). This last finding illustrates the degree of freedom obtained by the
availability of several policy instruments. The NDD serves political interests
by using the regional coverage rate but reduces the risk involved by raising
insurance premiums.
3. The market share variable is introduced in the regression model as an indi-
cator of competitive export promotion. This variable is highly significant in the
estimation equation of the insurance premium rate. Exporters to markets where
Belgian firms already occupy a relatively strong market position, are able to ne-
gotiate lower premium rates on newly insured contracts. The premium reduction
ranges, depending on the sample considered, from 1.2 to 1.8 percentage points
for every 10 percentage point increase in the share of Belgian exports in world
exports to a particular country. For the same market share, the subsidised coun-
try group obtains the largest premium advantage. As mentioned in Section 1,
the subsidised firms are concentrated in few industries and export to a limited
number of subsidised export destinations. Further evidence14 moreover shows
that the NDD tends to insure a larger proportion of total Belgian exports in mar-
kets with a higher Belgian market share. All of this adds up to a picture that
accords well with the predictions of a political economy model of trade policy.
EXPORT PROMOTION 23
Groups of companies with common interests are well established in selected
high-risk markets and rely intensively on official export insurance to eliminate
the substantial risk. They obtain a better premium deal than comparable export
firms in markets where Belgian firms capture a smaller share of the market.
The influence of business interests is not reflected in the regional coverage
rate. Quite on the contrary, the market share variable in Table 4 is negative.
This may be motivated by the need to keep the cost of charging lower pre-
mium rates to targeted export markets under control by restricting the share
of those markets in the global insurance portfolio. If this explanation is correct,
we again observe an interesting example of how insurance policy instruments
are combined to balance the various policy objectives.
Conclusion
This paper takes a detailed look at official export insurance as a real world case
of export promotion. We provide a theoretical, institutional and econometric as-
sessment of the multidimensional objective function of a typical official export
insurance agency. We show how the Belgian OEIA combines the regional cov-
erage and the insurance premium rate as instruments to achieve those policy
objectives.
The analysis leads to several insights in real world export promotion. One
important finding is that export promotion does not necessarily imply trade
distortion. A key objective of OEIAs is to insure the risk of default in high risk
markets. In this way, they support exports to markets where exporting com-
panies would perhaps not sell otherwise. An outcome of the theoretical model
is that this objective of risk reduction can be achieved without subsidisation
by charging a fair premium. And this is what actually happens in many export
contracts that are insured by the Belgian NDD. We found that most export des-
tinations do not benefit from insurance premium subsidies. Moreover, the NDD
takes risk characteristics into account in its premium setting and in the regional
composition of its portfolio. In this way, the NDD operates, at least partially, like
a private insurance company with positive effects on international trade. Sec-
ond, the opposite side of the coin is that OEIAs actively support companies from
a selected group of sectors, exporting to a limited number of targeted export
destinations. They provide insurance premium subsidies and do not fully adjust
premium and regional coverage rates to higher risk of default in the importing
country. This should not come as all that much of a surprise because OEIAs are
usually mandated by their statutes to strengthen the competitive position of do-
mestic exporters. In doing so, they are influenced by the preferences of those
(groups of) companies that actively use official export insurance to establish a
strong market position in selected markets. From a free trade point of view, this
type of competitive export promotion is worrisome. A third theme concerns the
close relationship between export promotion and other areas of policy-making.
Wider political considerations matter considerably for official export insurance.
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In the Belgian case, we found policies on official development assistance and
debt rescheduling to significantly affect regional coverage rates and insurance
premium rates.
These findings carry important implications for supra-national subsidy con-
trol. Risk reduction yields positive effects on trade. Therefore the WTO and the
EU are right not to throw out the baby with the bath-water by outlawing offi-
cial export insurance altogether. Having said this, it remains a formidable task
to rule out the trade distortion that arises from competitive export insurance.
The WTO Subsidy Code stipulates that OEIAs are not allowed to accumulate
long-term losses guarantees. This guarantees that a fair premium is charged
for all insured export destinations combined. Yet, it does not rule out that trade
distorting insurance premium subsidies are granted on contracts to selected
export markets. More binding restrictions on premium rates run the risk that the
OEIA shifts to different insurance policy instruments in their efforts to expand
exports of domestic companies. In turn, the close link between official devel-
opment assistance and official export insurance offers considerable scope to
camouflage some of the losses of the official export insurer as development
aid. In sum, effective control of official export insurance requires close scrutiny
of individual cases and considerable enforcement power. This may be feasible
within the framework of EU competition policy but, unless a voluntary agree-
ment within the WTO or the OECD can be reached, is difficult to achieve on a
multilateral scale.
The insights presented are also relevant for academic research on trade pol-
icy. It is well known from strategic trade literature (e.g. Eaton and Grossman
(1986)) that trade policy prescriptions are highly sensitive to variations in the
competitive conduct and the structural factors of the targeted industries. We
demonstrate that, even within the same export promotion agency, different pol-
icy objectives result in divergent policy outcomes. Therefore a careful modelling
of the institutions that conduct trade policy contributes significantly to the un-
derstanding of trade issues. This paper takes one step in this direction.
Appendix
The data for the premium and regional coverage rates were obtained from the
NDD and refer to the total of short and long term commitments, primarily related
to the public agency’s own activities. They are provided on an annual basis, cov-
ering the period from 1984 to 1993. We have information on the value of insured
contracts, premium income, claims and recovered amounts on a country-by-
country basis for approximately 120 countries of destination. We used these
data to construct the ri ; hi and clmsi;exp variables. Since we need the first three
years to calculate the adaptive claims ratio, the regressions run from 1987 to
1993.
For the explanatory variables, we used data from various sources. The vari-
ables rvsi ; gdpcapi ; gdpgrwi and fdii are based on figures from the IMF’s
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International Financial Statistics. Data for the debti and debtsvi variables were
taken from the World Debt Tables published by the IMF. For odai;hist, we used
data from “Geographical distribution of financial flows to developing countries”
(OECD, 1990, p. 341).
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Notes
1. Mainly due to moral hazard, export insurance for risky export destinations is usually not avail-
able in the private sector.
2. Insured exports represent only a small share of total exports (less than 15%) in the selected
countries. The exceptions are Japan (41%) and Austria (20.8%) which apply lower subsidy
rates to a broader group of exporters.
3. An alternative definition takes into account recoveries. These are the amounts collected from
the defaulting importer after the OEIA has compensated the insured exporter for his loss. Since
recoveries enter the OEIA’s accounts in different ways across countries, we adopt the subsidy
definition without recoveries in the remainder of the paper. This does not alter in any respect
the main conclusions of this section. Subsidy rates including recoveries can be obtained from
the authors.
4. In countries such as the Netherlands and Austria OEIAs are (semi)-private companies.
5. In Belgium, part of the losses of the OEIA are since 1991 covered by funds from the official
development agency pointing to the close relation between export insurance and development
policies.
6. The regional coverage rates for the 1984–1988 and the 1989–1993 periods are respectively
30.1% and 41%.
7. For more detailed information on the Belgian data, we refer to Dewit (1996), pp. 124–125.
8. We adopt a mean-variance approach to simplify the theoretical derivation of the premium rating
rule. For a more general expected utility formulation of the firm’s problem, we refer to Dewit
(1996).
9. The full coverage constraint for individual contracts incorporating a commercial risk of default
is justified by most OEIAs’ policy to offer contracts close to full coverage.
10. The underlying indirect utility function is equal to V ⁄i D E⁄i C C⁄i .pid; pif; : : :/.
11. We refer to the Appendix for a description of the data.
12. Frankel and Rose (1996) incorporate this variable in a model explaining the determinants of
currency crashes in emerging markets.
13. The absolute regression coefficient for the subsidised country group is twice the one for the
taxed subsample. To better understand what this means, it is useful to compute the implied
elasticities at the mean values of the dependent and the independent variables. An increase
by 1% of Belgian official development assistance to a country leads to an increase in the
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regional coverage rate of 2% for the subsidised country group and by 0.7% for the taxed
export destinations.
14. Reported in Dewit (1996, p. 147) and available from the authors.
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